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A Reference Manual for Child Tax Benefits 
The individual income tax contains a number of provisions that adjust tax burdens or provide 
direct subsidies for the presence of children. Three types of arguments are made for these 
provisions. The oldest is that taxpayers should be taxed on ability to pay, and, therefore, it is 
appropriate to adjust for family size or for certain child care expenses. At any income level, for 
instance, a family of four has only half the per capita income of a family of two and, in a 
progressive tax system, at least some lower ability to pay. A second justification is simply to 
support children and their families, often in ways similar to welfare. Finally, some tax provisions 
attempt to encourage certain types of behavior; for instance, the earned income tax credit (EITC) 
was adopted partly as an incentive to work and an alternative to welfare.  
When direct spending and tax provisions for children are counted together, the tax 
provisions account for a substantial share of the total and a very large portion of any new growth. 
Work by Isaacs and colleagues (2010) finds that in fiscal year 2009, tax credits and tax 
expenditures accounted for $132 billion of assistance to families with children. This number 
includes several significant recent changes in tax programs, such as the doubling of the child tax 
credit from $500 to $1,000 through legislation beginning in 2001. Along with other 2001 and 
2003 tax cuts, this provision is not yet permanent.  
Though sometimes considered universal, few child tax benefits truly extend to all 
children. What is more, confusion abounds. Low-, middle-, and high-income families qualify for 
different benefits. While some benefits are awarded equally per child, others decline in value for 
each successive child, and some are available only for a limited number of children in each 
family. In fact, although low-income families receive higher subsidies than higher-income 
families for their first and second children, the inverse is true for the third and fourth children 
(Mumford 2010). Some child-related activities (including child care and college attendance) 
receive specific subsidies, while others (such as after-school activities) do not.  
To further complicate matters, the definition of a child is inconsistent among various tax 
subsidies. It varies by age, residency, citizenship status, and whether the taxpayer provides 
support for the child. Many of these provisions were enacted piecemeal, with different budget 
constraints contributing to the qualifications for eligibility.  
Although the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) 
and subsequent legislation greatly expanded some child-related benefits, they were set to revert 
to their pre-2001 levels at the close of 2010 until legislation would determine which of these 
provisions would be made permanent. A compromise at the end of 2010 between the president 
and Republicans in Congress extends these benefits through 2012.  
This paper first describes the child-related tax provisions in 2011 law and some of the 
scheduled changes in those provisions. We group the provisions into two categories: those that 
are usually the same per child, and those that are designed to encourage a particular activity, such 
as work, in households with children. These categories are not mutually exclusive but simply 
provide a convenient classification system. We also describe some proposals put forth by 
legislators and academics for reforming various child-related provisions. Of course, in 2011 the 
federal government is spending more than 50 percent more than it is collecting in taxes, leading 
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to budget pressures on all areas of spending, taxes, and tax subsidies and making the future of the 
entire tax code fairly uncertain. Table 1 summarizes the child-related provisions in the tax code. 
Table 1. Tax Credits for Families with Children under 2011 Tax Law 
 
Dependent 
exemption 
Child tax 
credit (CTC) 
Earned income 
tax credit 
(EITC) 
Child and 
dependent care 
tax credit 
(CDCTC) 
Lifelong 
learning credit 
(LLC)a 
American 
opportunity 
tax credit 
(AOTC)a 
Credit Information 
2011 value $3,700 exemption 
times marginal tax 
rate (between 0 and 
35 percent) per 
qualifying child 
$1,000 per 
qualifying child 
Maximum credit: 
• $3,094: 1 child 
• $5,112: 2 
children 
• $5,751: 3 
children 
(increase of 
$2,630 for 
families with one 
child from credit 
for childless 
families) 
20–35% of up to 
$3,000 in child 
care expenses, 
(per child), 
depending on 
household AGI. 
Maximum credit: 
$2,100. 
20% of tuition and 
fees for any 
postsecondary 
education; 
maximum of 
$2,000 for the 
household  
Up to $2,500 
spent on 
tuition, fees, 
and course 
materials per 
student in 
their first four 
years of 
postsecondary 
education 
Is the credit 
refundable? 
No Additional refund 
available (up to 
15% of earnings 
over $3,000) 
Yes No No Up to 40% 
($1,000) 
refundable 
Total tax 
expenditure in 
2011b 
$29,636  
(0.19% GDP)c 
$48,340  
(0.31% GDP) 
$57,650  
(0.37% GDP) 
$2,200  
(0.01% GDP) 
$3,360  
(0.02% GDP) 
$11,380 
(0.07% GDP) 
Total tax 
expenditure in 
2015b  
$20,688  
(0.11% GDP)c 
$11,370  
(0.06% GDP) 
$53,470  
(0.28% GDP) 
$1,650  
(0.01% GDP) 
$5,510  
(0.03% GDP) 
n/a 
How is it indexed 
over time? 
Indexed for 
inflation 
Credit is not 
indexed; threshold 
for refundable 
credit is indexed 
Qualifying income 
levels and credit 
amount are 
indexed for 
inflation 
Allowable 
expenses are not 
indexed for 
inflation 
Allowable 
expenses are not 
indexed for 
inflation 
Allowable 
expenses are 
not indexed 
for inflation 
Eligibility Information 
Child age limit Under 19 
(under 24 if 
student for at 
least 5 months) 
Under 17 Under 19 
(under 24 if 
student for at 
least 5 months) 
Under 13 Must be 
taxpayer‘s 
dependent 
Must be 
taxpayer‘s 
dependent 
Relationship test Taxpayer‘s 
child, stepchild, 
foster child, 
sibling or 
stepsibling, or a 
descendant of 
one of these 
Taxpayer‘s child, 
stepchild, foster 
child, sibling or 
stepsibling, or a 
descendant of 
one of these 
Taxpayer‘s 
child, stepchild, 
foster child, 
sibling or 
stepsibling, or a 
descendant of 
one of these 
Taxpayer‘s 
child, stepchild, 
foster child, 
sibling or 
stepsibling, or a 
descendant of 
one of these 
Taxpayer‘s 
child, stepchild, 
foster child, 
sibling or 
stepsibling, or a 
descendant of 
one of these 
Taxpayer‘s child, 
stepchild, foster 
child, sibling or 
stepsibling, or a 
descendant of one 
of these 
Residence test Same principal 
residence as 
taxpayer for at 
least 6 months 
(except children 
of divorced 
parents and/or 
kidnapped 
children) 
Same principal 
residence as 
taxpayer for at 
least 6 months 
(except children 
of divorced 
parents and/or 
kidnapped 
children) 
Same principal 
residence as 
taxpayer for at 
least 6 months 
Same principal 
residence as 
taxpayer for at 
least 6 months  
Same principal 
residence as 
taxpayer for at 
least 6 months 
(except children 
of divorced 
parents and/or 
kidnapped 
children) 
Same principal 
residence as 
taxpayer for at 
least 6 months 
(except children 
of divorced 
parents and/or 
kidnapped 
children) 
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Support test Child must not 
provide more 
than half of 
his/her own 
support 
Child must not 
provide more 
than half of 
his/her own 
support 
None Child must not 
provide more 
than half of 
his/her own 
support 
Child must not 
provide more 
than half of 
his/her own 
support 
Child must not 
provide more than 
half of his/her 
own support 
Does the child have to 
be a U.S. citizen/ 
national/resident? 
No; can also be 
a resident of 
Canada or 
Mexico  
Yes No, but parent 
must hold valid 
Social Security 
Number 
No No; can also be a 
resident of 
Canada or 
Mexico  
No; can also be a 
resident of Canada 
or Mexico  
Is the credit available to 
taxpayers who are 
dependents? 
No Yes No No No No 
Income threshold None; not 
available to 
AMT filers 
• Joint return AGI 
up to $110,000 
• Single/HoH 
return AGI up to 
$75,000  
(5% phaseout for 
each $1,000 
earned above the 
threshold) 
AGI (or earned 
income) below  
• $36,052 with 1 
child 
• $40,964 with 2 
children 
• $43,998 with 3 
children 
($5,080 higher 
in each category 
for joint filers) 
Investment 
income less than 
$3,150 
None, but credit 
level varies 
with income: 
• AGI 
< $15,000: 35% 
credit 
• Credit 
decreases 1% 
for every 
$2,000 
additional AGI 
• AGI higher 
than $43,000: 
20% credit 
Households with 
eligible expenses 
up to AGI of 
$61,000 
($122,000 joint 
return); phased 
out for AGI 
between $51,000 
and $61,000 
($102,000– 
$122,000 joint 
return) 
Households with 
eligible expenses 
up to AGI of 
$90,000 
($180,000 joint 
return); phased 
out for AGI 
between $80,000 
and $90,000 
($160,000–
$180,000 joint 
return) 
Dependent gross 
income test 
Child's gross 
income cannot 
exceed $3,700 
Child's gross 
income cannot 
exceed $3,700 
None None Child's gross 
income cannot 
exceed $3,700 
Child's gross 
income cannot 
exceed $3,700 
Additional 
requirements 
None None Must work and 
earn income 
Must have 
qualifying child 
care expenses 
(up to $6,000) 
Must have 
qualifying tuition 
and related 
expenses at an 
eligible 
educational 
institution 
Must have 
qualifying tuition 
and related 
expenses at an 
eligible 
educational 
institution 
Sources: Internal Revenue Service, ―A ‗Qualifying Child,‘‖ FS-2005-7, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0, 
id=133298,00.html; ―Publication 970 (2009), Tax Benefits for Education,‖ http://www.irs.gov/publications/p970/ 
index.html; and ―Publication 501: Main Content,‖ http://www.irs.gov/publications/p501/ar02.html. 
a. Education credits may also be claimed by the student directly if he or she is not a dependent. In this table, we 
assume the student can be claimed as someone else‘s dependent. In 2011, the Hope credit was replaced with the 
American opportunity tax credit. 
b. Taken from Budget of the United States, FY 2011 Analytical Perspectives. Numbers in millions of dollars.  
c. For children age 0–18. Estimates were produced by the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation 
Model (version 0509-7). Revenue estimates include a microdynamic behavioral response. Estimates assume an 
elasticity of taxable income with respect to (1 - marginal rate) of 0.25. Current policy makes the 2001 and 2003 
individual income tax cuts permanent and extends the 2009 AMT patch. It also indexes the AMT exemption, rate 
bracket threshold, and phaseout exemption threshold for inflation. Fiscal-year revenue numbers assume a 75-25 
split. The actual effect on receipts could differ. Baseline is current law; proposal is current law without dependent 
exemptions. In the proposal, only exemptions for dependents are eliminated; taxpayer exemptions and exemptions 
for spouse, wherever applicable, can be availed of.  
Significant Provisions Affecting Families with Children: Per Child Benefits 
Some child tax benefits base eligibility purely on the number of qualifying children in a family. 
In most cases, each additional child accrues the same benefit. The largest of these benefits are the 
dependent exemption and the child tax credit (CTC). In the case of the dependent exemption, a 
set amount of income per child is exempted from taxation; in the case of the CTC, families 
receive a $1,000 credit for each child. As will be explained in more detail, some families may not 
receive the full exemption or credit to which they are entitled because they either do not have 
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enough income to take full advantage of the exemption or credit or have too much income and 
are subject to benefit phaseouts. 
Dependent Exemption 
In 2011, families could exempt $3,700 of income from taxation for each child under age 19 or 
under age 24 and a full-time student for at least five months of the year. Beyond passing the age 
test, children must also pass relationship, residency, and support tests (table 1). Families may 
claim qualifying children or relatives as dependents. If a child is older than 18 and is not a 
student, he or she may qualify as a relative instead of a child if he or she meets age residency and 
support tests that are the same as those for a qualifying child, along with a gross income test.
1
 In 
2011, a person must have gross income below $3,700 to be a qualifying relative. Qualifying 
children are not subject to the gross income test. 
The dependent exemption amount grows annually with inflation. The value of the tax 
savings from this exemption depends on the taxpayer‘s marginal tax rate, which in recent years 
has ranged from 0 to 35 percent. Higher-income families facing higher marginal rates benefit 
more from excluding income from taxation than lower-income families. In other words, a family 
facing a 10 percent marginal rate saves only 10 cents for each dollar exempted from taxation; 
families facing a 35 percent marginal rate save 35 cents for each untaxed dollar.  
Before 2009, the dependent exemption phased out completely for higher-income families, 
which reduced the amount of income they could exempt from taxation. Under this phaseout rule, 
married couples saw their exemption phased out by 2 percent for each additional dollar in their 
adjusted gross income (AGI) over $250,200; the exemption for single parents phased out once 
their AGI equaled $208,500. Beginning in 2009, the phaseout cannot reduce the total exemption 
by more than a third. If the 2001 tax cuts had expired as planned, the full phaseout of the 
dependent exemption would have returned in 2011. As it stands, the compromise between the 
president and Republicans in Congress pushes this decision down the road two more years.
2
  
                                                          
1
 See Internal Revenue Service, ―A ‗Qualifying Child,‘‖ FS-2005-7, 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=133298,00.html.  
2
 See Internal Revenue Service, ―Publication 501: Main Content,‖ http://www.irs.gov/publications/p501/ar02.html. 
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Figure 1. Dependent Exemption for a Single Parent with Two Kids, 2011 Tax Law 
 
Source: Based on author calculations.  
Notes: Personal exemptions based on a single parent with two children who qualify as dependents. All income 
comes from cash wages. Figure does not account for interactions with other credits. 
Because parents are also allowed to exempt income based solely on their filing status 
(either married or head of household) and for themselves and a spouse (if applicable), they must 
have income in excess of the sum of these amounts to also benefit from the dependent 
exemption. In 2011, married couples could exempt $19,000 from taxation as a result of their own 
personal exemption (2 x $3,700) and the standard deduction ($11,600); single parents could 
exempt $12,200 before accounting for the dependent exemption ($3,700 + $8,500). Families 
with incomes below these thresholds receive no benefit from the dependent exemption because 
their total taxable income can be reduced to zero without applying the dependent exemption for 
any children in the household. In all cases, the benefit from the dependent exemption cannot 
exceed tax liability. 
The dependent exemption, like an additional personal exemption for a second adult in the 
family and a higher standard deduction for joint versus single returns, was designed for the most 
part on an ability-to-pay argument. At times, the personal and dependent exemptions were set at 
levels designed to try to exempt income up to poverty level from taxation; since the poverty level 
rises with family size, so also would the amount of exempt income (Steuerle 1983).  
A couple with two children that makes $100,000 a year would exempt $7,400 from their 
taxable income as a result of the dependent exemption. The regular income tax treats them 
similarly to a couple with no children that earns $92,600 in income, all other things being equal. 
Few would argue that the dependent exemption completely compensates for the reduced ability 
to pay taxes resulting from raising the two children and that, even with the exemption, the family 
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of four could attain the same living standard. Yet, if the couple‘s dependent exemption were 
capped like a credit and reduced to that of taxpayers in a 10 percent bracket (rather than a 25 
percent bracket), then they would be taxed closer to a household with no children that earns 
about $97,000 in income. Thus, whether the tax preference for a child is a credit or a deduction 
can make a big difference. 
In designing a tax system as a whole, choosing a deduction or credit is not an issue of 
progressivity. We can assess a tax of $20,000 each on our two families above with $100,000 of 
income, or we can tax the one with two children $19,075 and the one with no children $20,925—
assuming a dependent exemption of $3,700 per child and a tax bracket (on last dollars earned) of 
25 percent. Progressivity can be maintained whether one uses deductions or credits to adjust 
taxes for the presence of children.  
In sum, under an ability-to-pay theory, the dependent exemption is first used to determine 
who should be treated as equals when dealing with families of different size. Then, a progressive 
rate structure can be applied to yield whatever revenue and degree of progressivity is sought.  
Another twist in the tax code, however, reduces the value of the dependent exemption for 
many higher-income individuals: the alternative minimum tax (AMT). The dependent exemption 
is essentially treated as a tax shelter that is allowed for regular income tax purposes but not for 
purposes of the AMT. As a result, approximately 800,000 filers are subject to the AMT as a 
result of having children. These taxpayers basically receive no benefit or only a partial benefit 
from the dependent exemption, even though few people argue that the personal exemption is 
really a tax shelter, or that one purpose of the AMT is to extract higher taxes on larger families. 
In an extreme case, a family can be subject to the AMT simply because it is raising too many 
kids even though it claims the standard deduction, takes no other deductions, credits, or 
exclusions, and engages in no real tax shelters. In effect, the AMT indirectly rejects the notion 
that taking care of dependents has any effect on one‘s ability to pay tax.  
The Tax Policy Center (TPC) projects the dependent exemption will provide $38 billion 
in benefits to 48 million families in 2010. Benefits are concentrated among higher-income 
families (table 2).  
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Table 2. Distribution of Dependent Exemption Benefits for Tax Units with Children,  
by Cash Income Percentile, 2010 
Cash income 
percentile
a
 
Share of total tax 
benefits 
Lowest quintile 1.5 
Second quintile 16.4 
Middle quintile 25.0 
Fourth quintile 29.8 
Top quintile 27.3 
  
Addendum  
80–90th percent 17.9 
90–95th percent 6.7 
95–99th percent 1.4 
Top 1 percent 1.3 
Top 0.1 percent 0.2 
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-6). 
Notes: Calendar year 2010. Tax units with children are those claiming an exemption for children at home or away 
from home. Baseline is current policy with no dependent exemptions allowed. Proposal is current policy with 
dependent exemptions. Current policy makes the 2001 and 2003 individual income tax cuts permanent, extends the 
2009 alternative minimum tax (AMT) patch, and indexes the AMT exemption, rate bracket threshold, and phaseout 
exemption threshold for inflation. Under the baseline, only exemptions for dependents are disallowed: taxpayer 
exemptions and exemptions for spouse can be availed of when applicable. 
a. Tax units with negative cash income are excluded from the lowest income class but are included in the totals. For 
a description of cash income, see http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxModel/income.cfm. The cash income 
percentile classes are based on the income distribution for the entire population and contain an equal number of 
people, not tax units. The incomes used are adjusted for family size by dividing by the square root of the number of 
people in the tax unit. The resulting percentile breaks are (in 2009 dollars) 20%, $12,047; 40%, $22,949; 60%, 
$39,314; 80%, $65,826; 90%, $95,193; 95%, $132,881; 99%, $336,285; and 99.9%, $1,353,961. 
Child Tax Credit  
To qualify for the child tax credit, a child must be under the age of 17 and pass relationship, 
residency, and support tests (table 1). The CTC was first enacted as a $500 credit in the Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 1997. It was nonrefundable so only families owing income tax could benefit from 
it.
3
 The Economic Growth and Taxpayer Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 amended the CTC by 
making it refundable on a broader scale and doubling its value from $500 to $1,000. The 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) extended refundability to even 
lower levels so that in 2009 and 2010, families with earnings above $3,000 could receive a 
refundable credit up to a maximum of 15 percent of earnings. This has now been extended 
through 2012. Absent that legislation, families only received the refundable credit for earnings 
above $12,000. The provision that allows the CTC to be refundable is technically known as the 
additional child tax credit (ACTC) but is often referred to as the refundable CTC. Absent the 
extension of ARRA and EGTRRA, the CTC will revert to its pre-EGTRRA level of $500 per 
child with limited refundability. The baseline of the president‘s budget calls for maintaining the 
                                                          
3
 Before EGTRRA, only families with at least three children could claim a refundable credit, to the extent that 
payroll taxes exceeded their EITC. 
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value of the credit at $1,000 per child and continuing to allow refunds on the CTC up to 15 
percent of earnings over $3,000. 
Figure 2. Child Tax Credit for a Single Parent with Two Kids, 2011 Tax Law 
Source: Based on author calculations.  
Notes: Personal exemptions based on a single parent with two children under age 17. Children and parents meet all 
other requirements to qualify for the credit. All income comes from cash wages. Figure does not account for 
interactions with other credits. 
The original phase-in range for the CTC was pegged to coincide with the end of the 
phase-in range for the EITC for families with at least two children to address concerns over high 
marginal tax rates for families receiving the EITC. As a result of rules enacted under ARRA, 
however, the credit begins to phase in much sooner. Still, the income range over which the 
ACTC phases in overlaps at least part of the range over which the EITC phases out; as a result, 
the CTC partly offsets the high marginal tax rates associated with the phaseout of the EITC. The 
CTC is available to most taxpayers with children, although it phases out at a rate of 5 percent of 
adjusted gross income above $110,000 for married couples ($75,000 for single parents). Further, 
dependents may claim a separate child credit from their parents if they themselves have a 
qualifying child. 
The CTC has displaced the dependent exemption‘s role as the largest tax code provision 
benefiting families with children; it is projected to distribute almost $52 billion to 34.9 million 
families with children in 2010 through the nonrefundable and refundable credits (table 3). On 
average, TPC projects that the CTC reduces tax liability for families with children by $1,025 in 
2010. In total, about 10 percent of benefits will go to families in the lowest income quintile (who 
generally owe little or no income tax). Roughly 80 percent of benefits accrue to families with 
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incomes in the next three quintiles. The remaining 10 percent of benefits go to families with 
incomes in the top quintile.  
Table 3. Distribution of Child Tax Credit Benefits for Tax Units with Children,  
by Cash Income Percentile, 2010 
Cash income percentile
a
 
Share of total 
federal tax benefits 
Lowest quintile 10.2 
Second quintile 25.0 
Middle quintile 26.6 
Fourth quintile 27.7 
Top quintile 10.3 
  
Addendum  
80–90th percent 9.5 
90–95th percent 0.6 
95–99th percent 0.2 
Top 1 percent 0.0 
Top 0.1 percent 0.0 
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-4), table T10-0128.  
Note: Calendar year. Benefits of the credit are calculated under current law. 
a. Tax units with negative cash income are excluded from the lowest income class but are included in the totals. For 
a description of cash income, see http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxModel/income.cfm. The cash income 
percentile classes used in this table are based on the income distribution for the entire population and contain an 
equal number of people, not tax units. The incomes used are adjusted for family size by dividing by the square root 
of the number of people in the tax unit. The resulting percentile breaks are (in 2009 dollars) 20%, $12,047; 40%, 
$22,949; 60%, $39,314; 80%, $65,826; 90%, $95,193; 95%, $132,881; 99%, $336,285; and 99.9%, $1,353,961. 
The child credit represents a hybrid of a per-child credit and a credit encouraging 
behavior in that it is justified both as a subsidy for raising children and as an adjustment for 
ability to pay. The dependent exemption also has eroded enormously in value over the years, and 
the child credit might be viewed as an alternative way of making adjustments—albeit without 
regard to the tax bracket of the taxpayer. Yet, the extension of the child credit even to taxpayers 
owing no liability makes clear that many view the credit as a subsidy for raising children 
(Steuerle 2008). 
Significant Provisions Affecting Families with Children: Benefits Aimed at Encouraging an 
Activity 
A second set of tax benefits related to children are aimed at encouraging a particular behavior. 
Two specific behaviors get special attention by Congress: work by parents and college 
attendance by children. In some ways, tax policies substitute for traditional expenditure 
programs, which typically are means tested (that is, reduced in value for households with higher 
incomes). In this section, we describe the earned income tax credit, the child and dependent care 
tax credit (CDCTC), and higher education credits. 
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Earned Income Tax Credit  
The earned income tax credit subsidizes work for low-income families. Children must pass 
relationship and residency tests and be either under age 19 or under age 24 and a full-time 
student for at least five months of the year (table 1). Beneficiaries receive a credit worth a fixed 
percentage of earnings until they qualify for the maximum credit (figure 3). Both the percentage 
and the maximum credit depend on the number of children in the family. After the maximum 
credit is reached, recipients receive that credit until their earnings reach a designated phaseout 
point. From that point forward, the credit falls with each additional dollar of income until it 
disappears entirely. The phaseout begins at a higher income level for married couples than for 
single parents. The credit is fully refundable; any excess credit beyond a family‘s income tax 
liability is paid as a tax refund. The maximum credit amounts, as well as the income phase-in 
and phaseout ranges, are indexed annually for inflation.  
In 2011, families with three or more qualifying children may receive a credit up to 
$5,751. The maximum credit is $5,112 for families with two qualifying children, $3,094 for 
families with one qualifying child, and just $464 for those without qualifying children (figure 3). 
In other words, a household with one child could earn an EITC benefit up to $2,630 larger than a 
household with no children. Unlike the child credit, where dependents with a child may claim the 
credit separately from their parents, dependents cannot claim the EITC.  
The EITC is the largest cash assistance program targeted at low-income families and 
comparable in size to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly Food 
Stamps). In 2010, the TPC projects 20.1 million households with children will receive an 
average credit of $2,661. This amounts to $53.4 billion in reduced taxes and refunds. The credit 
lifts roughly 4 million people out of poverty each year.
4
 Traditionally, more eligible people 
benefit from the EITC than similarly targeted means-tested transfer programs. More than 80 
percent of individuals eligible for the EITC in 1999 claimed the credit, a much higher take-up 
rate than for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (52 percent) or SNAP (67 percent) that 
year (Burman and Kobes 2003). 
                                                          
4
 See Adam Carasso and Elaine Maag, ―Taxation and the Family: What Is the Earned Income Tax Credit?‖ in the 
Tax Policy Center Briefing Book, http://taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/. 
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Figure 3. Earned Income Credit, 2011 Tax Law 
 
Source: Based on author calculations.  
Notes: Personal exemptions based on a single parent with two children who qualify as dependents. All income 
comes from cash wages. Figure does not account for interactions with other credits. Dashed lines show extended 
phaseouts for married couples. 
One criticism of various income-tested programs is that they contain significant marriage 
penalties for some couples. In the case of the EITC, the story is mixed, as it provides marriage 
subsidies to some, penalties to others. In the extreme, when two modest-income parents marry, 
they could both lose the EITC that each qualified for as single parents. That is, their combined 
income exceeds the point at which the EITC phases out (Acs and Maag 2005). For example, in 
2011, if two single parents with one child earning $16,400 each decided to marry, they would go 
from each receiving the maximum one-child EITC of $3,094 (a combined $6,188) to receiving 
one EITC for the two children worth $2,800—less than half their pre-marriage credit. 
Conversely, a single parent with no earnings can move from receiving no EITC to receiving a 
substantial EITC should she marry a partner with earnings in the EITC range. 
As a result of ARRA, the EITC begins to phase out at incomes $5,080 higher for couples 
than for singles in 2011. EGTRRA had already been increasing the phaseout income level for 
married couples in $1,000 increments since 2001, up to $3,000 by 2008. Several other options to 
reduce these marriage penalties have been proposed, including creating an individual worker 
credit and discounting the wages of secondary earners (summarized in Holt and Maag 2009 and 
Carasso et al. 2008). 
Over half of all benefits from the EITC accrue to families in the lowest income quintile, 
and another 42 percent accrue to families in the second income quintile (table 4). Almost no 
families in the upper two income quintiles benefit from the EITC. 
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Table 4. Distribution of Federal Tax Changes due to the Earned Income Tax Credit  
for Tax Units with Children by Cash Income Percentile Adjusted for Family Size, 
2010 
Cash income percentile
a
 
Share of total 
federal tax change 
Lowest quintile 54.2 
Second quintile 41.7 
Middle quintile 3.7 
Fourth quintile 0.1 
Top quintile 0.0 
  
Addendum  
80–90th percent 0.0 
90–95th percent 0.0 
95–99th percent 0.0 
Top 1 percent 0.0 
Top 0.1 percent 0.0 
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-5), table T10-0126. 
Notes: Calendar year. Tax units with children are those claiming an exemption for children at home or away from 
home. Baseline is current law, proposal is to remove the earned income tax credit (EITC). 
a. Tax units with negative cash income are excluded from the lowest income class but are included in the totals. For 
a description of cash income, see http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxModel/income.cfm. The cash income 
percentile classes are based on the income distribution for the entire population and contain an equal number of 
people, not tax units. The incomes used are adjusted for family size by dividing by the square root of the number of 
people in the tax unit. The resulting percentile breaks are (in 2009 dollars) 20%, $12,047; 40%, $22,949; 60%, 
$39,314; 80%, $65,826; 90%, $95,193; 95%, $132,881; 99%, $336,285; and 99.9%, $1,353,961. 
Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit/Flexible Spending Accounts 
Child care can present both a barrier to entering the workforce and an additional expense that 
makes work less rewarding (Burman, Maag, and Rohaly 2005). In addition, on an ability-to-pay 
basis, a household with $50,000 of income and $3,000 of child care expenses has no more ability 
to pay tax than a household with $47,000 of income and $3,000 worth of child care provided in 
the home. Thus, some allowance for child care expenses can be considered as one way of 
providing neutrality between care in the home and care outside the home. 
Under current law, working parents can offset child care costs through the child and 
dependent care tax credit (CDCTC). To receive the CDCTC, parents report up to $3,000 of child 
care–related expenses per qualifying child (to a maximum of $6,000 per family) and receive a 
credit of between 20 and 35 percent of that amount, depending on their adjusted gross income. 
Higher credit rates are available to families with lower AGIs. To benefit from the CDCTC, both 
parents must be working or in school. The expenses claimed may not exceed the lower-earning 
parent‘s earnings. Qualifying children must be under age 13 and must pass residency, 
relationship, and support tests. 
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Figure 4. Child and Dependent Care Credit for a Single Parent with Two Kids,  
2011 Tax Law 
Source: Based on author calculations.  
Notes: Personal exemptions based on a single parent with two children under age 13. Maximum amount of child 
care expenses ($6,000) is claimed. All income comes from cash wages. Figure does not account for interactions with 
other credits. 
The highest credit rate for the CDCTC (35 percent) applies to families with AGI below 
$15,000 and decreases by 1 percentage point for each additional $2,000 of AGI. The lowest 
credit rate (20 percent) applies to families with AGI greater than $43,000 (figure 4). Because the 
credit is nonrefundable, under current law the high credit rates remain elusive.
5
 Those for whom 
the highest credit rates apply rarely owe taxes, and as a result they rarely receive any benefit 
from the provision.  
People in the highest two income quintiles receive the greatest share of benefits, both 
because their average expenses are higher than other income groups and because more people in 
this quintile have child care expenses (table 4).  
                                                          
5
 See Elaine Maag, ―Taxation and the Family: How Does the Tax System Subsidize Child Care Expenses?‖ in the 
Tax Policy Center Briefing Book, http://taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/. 
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Table 4. Distribution of Child and Dependent Care Tax Benefits for Tax Units with 
Children, by Cash Income Percentile, 2010 
Cash income 
percentile
a
 
Share of total federal 
tax benefits 
Lowest quintile 0.1 
Second quintile 17.2 
Middle quintile 28.7 
Fourth quintile 31.5 
Top quintile 22.6 
  Addendum  
80–90th percent 13.6 
90–95th percent 5.9 
95–99th percent 2.7 
Top 1 percent 0.5 
Top 0.1 percent 0.0 
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-6).  
Notes: Calendar year. Tax units with children are those claiming an exemption for children at home or away from 
home. Baseline is current policy with no child and dependent care credit. Proposal is current policy with the child 
and dependent care credit. Current policy makes the 2001 and 2003 individual income tax cuts permanent, and it 
extends the 2009 AMT patch and indexes the AMT exemption, rate bracket threshold, and phaseout exemption 
threshold for inflation. Under the baseline, only exemptions for dependents are disallowed: taxpayer exemptions and 
exemptions for spouse can be availed of when applicable. 
a. Tax units with negative cash income are excluded from the lowest income class but are included in the totals. For 
a description of cash income, see http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxModel/income.cfm. The cash income 
percentile classes are based on the income distribution for the entire population and contain an equal number of 
people, not tax units. The incomes used are adjusted for family size by dividing by the square root of the number of 
people in the tax unit. The resulting percentile breaks are (in 2009 dollars) 20%, $12,047; 40%, $22,949; 60%, 
$39,314; 80%, $65,826; 90%, $95,193; 95%, $132,881; 99%, $336,285; and 99.9% $1,353,961. 
Maximum eligible expenses for the CDCTC were scheduled to revert back to their pre-
2001 levels in 2011 ($2,400 per child, $4,800 maximum per family), but that decision has been 
pushed off for two years. Absent additional legislation, the maximum credit rate will be reduced 
from 35 percent to 30 percent when the legislation expires. As part of his proposal to support 
middle-class families in America, President Obama has proposed extending the CDCTC. Under 
the extension, the maximum credit would be available to families earning up to $75,000, and all 
families earning over $103,000 would receive the minimum benefit (figure 5). Tax expenditures 
as a result of this extension would cost approximately $1.5 billion in 2015 (OMB 2011).  
Because of the particular design of the credit—both the low amount of qualifying income 
and a rate of credit below the taxpayer‘s marginal tax rate—it is often cheaper for higher-income 
parents to provide child care in the home and cheaper for lower-income parents to provide child 
care outside the home. One way to see this result is to assume two households with equal 
incomes that live side by side and consider exchanging kids for child care and paying each other. 
Assuming they pay each other an equal amount eligible for the credit, the lower-income 
household will be better off exchanging child care when its marginal tax rate is lower than the 
credit rate; the upper-income household will be better off doing its own child care when its tax 
rate is above the credit rate. In other words, the credit makes families better off when they are 
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able to replace the dollars spent on child care at a higher rate than the rate they are taxed on the 
dollars earned from additional work.  
At the same time, the child and dependent care tax credit has eroded in value 
substantially relative to income per household and the cost of child care. Thus, it makes only a 
modest difference in well-being in any case. Contrast, if you will, the revenue cost of the 
CDCTC with the EITC. The former entails revenue losses of only a tiny fraction of the latter. 
Figure 5. Maximum Child and Dependent Care Credit for a Single Parent with Two Kids 
under Various Budget Proposals 
 
Source: Based on author calculations.  
Notes: Personal exemptions based on a single parent with two children under age 13. Maximum amount of child 
care expenses ($6,000 under 2011–12 law, $4,800 under 2013 law) is claimed. All income comes from cash wages. 
Figure does not account for interactions with other credits. 
Parents can also benefit from flexible spending accounts (FSAs). FSAs allow parents 
with a qualifying child under age 13, or any age if the dependent is disabled, to reduce their 
taxable earnings by up to $5,000. Qualifying child requirements are identical between the FSA 
and CDCTC. Earnings in an FSA are exempt from both payroll and income taxes, although the 
exemption from Social Security tax in some cases can reduce later Social Security benefits. 
Because tax rates rise with income, higher benefits are available to higher-income families than 
lower-income families. 
Families may use both the CDCTC and an FSA to offset child care expenses on the 
condition that the same expenses are not applied to both programs and that the total expenses for 
which tax benefits are received do not exceed the maximum expenses a household is allowed to 
benefit from in either of the two programs. In the case of a family with one child, the family may 
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claim up to $3,000 in expenses for the CDCTC and apply an additional $2,000 of expenses in an 
FSA. In the case of families with more than one child, a typical situation might be exempting 
$5,000 in income via an FSA and then applying $1,000 of expenses to the CDCTC. Total 
expenses being claimed cannot exceed $6,000 in the two programs for families with more than 
one child.  
The benefit structure of the FSA and CDCTC means that high-income families tend to 
benefit more from an FSA than the CDCTC. In isolation (not considering other tax provisions), 
the nonrefundable nature of the CDCTC means that if a family does not have tax liability to 
offset with the CDCTC, it might be better off using an FSA for child care expenses to at least 
benefit from exempting payroll taxes from up to $5,000 in earnings (figure 6). However, many 
low-income families will qualify for the EITC and refundable CTC, so on net, will be better off 
not benefiting from the CDCTC but retaining the income as taxable income in order to benefit 
from these provisions. Higher-income families benefit more from an FSA since their marginal 
tax rate (federal income and payroll taxes) will exceed the credit rate. Unfortunately, we know 
neither who actually uses an FSA nor how much families benefit from using an FSA. 
Figure 6. Child Care FSA Exemption for a Single Parent with Two Kids, 2011 Tax Law 
 
Source: Based on author calculations.  
Notes: Exemption applied to both income tax and payroll taxes. Personal exemptions based on a single parent with 
two children who qualify as dependents. All income comes from cash wages. Figure does not account for 
interactions with other credits.  
Higher Education Credits 
The year 1997 saw enactment of several new tax incentives for higher education: the Hope 
credit, the lifetime learning credit, and a deduction for tuition and fees. As a result, federal higher 
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education in-school tax benefits rose from zero before 1997 to roughly $6 billion in 2005–06 
(Maag et al. 2007). College savings incentives in the tax code also exist, though they are not 
discussed here.  
The Hope credit applies to tuition and fees for students enrolled at least half time in their 
first two years of college. The credit equals 100 percent of the first $1,200 of eligible expenses 
plus 50 percent of the next $1,200, yielding an annual maximum credit of $1,800 when 
qualifying expenses are at least $2,400. Each qualifying student in the household can receive a 
Hope credit.  
The lifetime learning credit (LLC) provides a credit of 20 percent of tuition and fees for 
any postsecondary education, up to a maximum of $10,000 in expenses. Qualifying expenses are 
counted per tax return, not per student. While one student cannot benefit from both the Hope and 
the lifetime learning credit, different household members can benefit from different provisions. 
Like the Hope credit, the LLC phases out between adjusted gross incomes of $51,000 and 
$61,000 for single taxpayers and between $102,000 and $122,000 for married couples. There is 
no limit on the number of years of postsecondary education for which this credit is available. For 
both credits, the student must be either the taxpayer or someone taxpayer claims as a dependent. 
For 2009 and 2010 (then extended temporarily to 2011 and 2012), the Hope credit was 
modified by ARRA and was renamed the American Opportunity Tax Credit (AOTC). The 
AOTC provides a credit worth 100 percent of the first $2,000 of qualified expenses (tuition, fees, 
and some course materials) plus 25 percent of the next $2,000 of qualified expenses, yielding a 
maximum credit of $2,500 a year (figure 7). In addition to increasing the maximum credit, 
AOTC is available for the first four years of postsecondary education, rather than the first two, 
and expenses for course materials are now considered eligible costs, in addition to tuition and 
fees. Unlike the Hope credit, 40 percent of the AOTC is refundable and thus available to 
households with little or no tax liability.  
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Figure 7. American Opportunity and Lifetime Learning Credits, 2010 Tax Law 
 
Source: Based on author calculations.  
Notes: Personal exemptions based on a single parent with two children with qualifying education expenses. 
Maximum amount of expenses ($10,000) is claimed. All income comes from cash wages. Figure does not account 
for interactions with other credits. 
Previously, the nonrefundable credits acted mainly as subsidies to middle- and higher-
income households (table 6). Many students in these households would likely attend college even 
without the tax benefits. However, now that the AOTC has a refundable portion, the benefits 
extend to lower-income households who have generally lower college attendance rates. 
Additionally, the AOTC increases the income threshold before the phaseout range by $40,000 
for married couples and $20,000 for individuals. The president has proposed making the changes 
under the AOTC permanent.  
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Table 6. Distribution of American Opportunity Credit and the Lifetime Learning Credit  
for Tax Units with Children, by Cash Income Percentile, 2010 
Cash income 
percentile
a
 
Share of total federal 
tax benefits 
Lowest quintile 7.6 
Second quintile 10.8 
Middle quintile 26.9 
Fourth quintile 37.4 
Top quintile 17.1 
  
Addendum  
80–90th percent 13.5 
90–95th percent 3.2 
95–99th percent 0.4 
Top 1 percent 0.1 
Top 0.1 percent 0.0 
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0509-6). 
Notes: Calendar year. Tax units with children are those claiming an exemption for children at home or away from 
home. Baseline is current policy with no American Opportunity Tax Credit and lifetime learning credit. Proposal is 
current policy including both tax credits. Current policy makes the 2001 and 2003 individual income tax cuts 
permanent, extends the 2009 AMT patch, and indexes the AMT exemption, rate bracket threshold, and phaseout 
exemption threshold for inflation.  
a. Tax units with negative cash income are excluded from the lowest income class but are included in the totals. For 
a description of cash income, see http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxModel/income.cfm. The cash income 
percentile classes are based on the income distribution for the entire population and contain an equal number of 
people, not tax units. The incomes used are adjusted for family size by dividing by the square root of the number of 
people in the tax unit. The resulting percentile breaks are (in 2009 dollars) 20%, $12,047; 40%, $22,949; 60%, 
$39,314; 80%, $65,826; 90%, $95,193; 95%, $132,881; 99%, $336,285; and 99.9%, $1,353,961. 
Benefits under these credits averaged $771 per household before the ARRA changes. 
Average benefits are highest for those receiving a Hope credit ($1,069), followed by the LLC 
($978). For each student, families may claim only one of the two main tax benefits, but they need 
not claim the same benefit for all students. Before the ARRA changes to the Hope credit, it was 
often difficult to determine which credit would yield the maximum benefit; as a result, 
households risked receiving a benefit smaller than the maximum available to them (GAO 2005). 
The changes introduced as part of the AOTC alleviate this complexity, clearly making the AOTC 
the best choice in credit for most students. No cost estimates of the AOTC are available. 
Complexity of Child Benefits 
As alluded to already, the child benefits are far from straightforward. Families must first 
understand which child qualifies for which benefits, and then must decipher the level of subsidy 
for which they qualify. In addition, each benefit comes with its own design issues, often a relic of 
limited resources and the desire of politicians to create new programs with new labels. Taken 
separately, each benefit may make some sense, but in tandem, the benefits add up bizarrely. And, 
of course, the sum of the parts does not equal the whole (Maag 2010). Figure 8 shows the 
potential combination of four benefits for a single parent with two children: the dependent 
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exemption, the child credit, the EITC, and the CDCTC, assuming maximum use of the CDCTC. 
Both children in the sample family are under age 13. 
Figure 8. Value of Child Benefits for a Single Parent with Two Kids, 2011 Tax Law 
 
Source: Based on author calculations.  
Notes: Personal exemptions based on a single parent with two children under age 13 who qualify as dependents. All 
income comes from cash wages. Figure does not account for interactions with other credits. 
This type of complexity confuses taxpayers and makes IRS enforcement more difficult. 
Should the incentives or adjustments for ability to pay apply to every child, as child benefits like 
the CTC might suggest, or should there be limits on the number of children subsidized through 
the tax code, as suggested by programs like the EITC that cap benefits? Are families with three 
or fewer children preferred, as the EITC rules might imply? In the case of married couples, 
should both partners work, or should only one parent work? How much should a person work? If 
the goal is to affect behavior, then as the contradictions in the message increase, analysts and 
policymakers must figure out what messages people are receiving and responding to, if they are 
responding at all.  
The Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 simplified the rules for qualifying 
children. Relationship and residency tests were made uniform, but some differences remained. 
For example, to qualify for the CTC, a child must be under 17. Only child care expenses 
associated with children under age 13 qualify for the CDCTC. On the other hand, parents and 
guardians can qualify for the EITC and dependent exemption if they have children under 24 who 
are full-time students for at least five months of the year. The support test applies to all but the 
EITC.  
 21 
A second troubling issue with the child provisions is that their income phaseouts operate 
almost randomly. While the target income groups for each credit overlap at times, the various 
phaseouts can result in high marginal tax rates for families with particular incomes. It is easy to 
reach a 30 percent marginal tax rate simply from provisions in the tax code (figure 9). When 
combined with phaseouts from direct expenditure programs not examined here (SNAP, Medicaid 
or the new health subsidy, housing, and so forth), these tax rates can become very high. 
Figure 9. Marginal Tax Rates for a Single Parent with Two Kids, 2011 Tax Law 
 
Source: Based on author calculations.  
Notes: Personal exemptions based on a single parent with two children under age 13. All income comes from cash 
wages. Credits include the dependent exemption, child credit, earned income credit, and child and dependent care 
credit. Children and parents meet all other requirements to qualify for the credits. Figure does not account for 
interactions with other credits. 
Child Tax Benefits and Complexity 
Despite the complexity of the system, child-related provisions substantially assist low- and 
middle-income families. In an extreme case, under 2011 law, a family of three with income of 
approximately $21,500 can receive a maximum benefit of $8,740 from the dependent exemption, 
child credit, earned income tax credit, and child and dependent care credit. Even families with 
moderate and relatively high incomes benefit from some child-related provisions. For example, a 
single parent with two children with an income at the federal poverty level could receive 
approximately $7,400 in benefits, while a similar family earning twice the poverty level would 
receive approximately $5,500 in benefits.  
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Regardless of who benefits from these credits, there is an increasing demand to simplify 
the system. Multiple plans have been proposed to address the complexity of the tax credits, 
although many are also designed to address other areas of concern in the Internal Revenue Code. 
We highlight three basic courses of simplification, of which several variations have been 
proposed. 
In 1991, the National Commission on Children, chaired by Senator Jay Rockefeller, 
concluded its deliberations and proposed a number of reforms, including a $1,000 credit for 
children that was proposed by consultants Jason Juffras and Eugene Steuerle. Although not taken 
up by the Commission, the Steuerle and Juffras proposal, and several made by Steuerle since 
then, also suggested that increasing amounts of the child credit be tied to a requirement to 
purchase (or sign up, in the case of Medicaid) health insurance for the children—a forerunner of 
attempts to impose individual mandates for the purchase of health insurance (Juffras and Steuerle 
1991). 
Ten years later in 2001, Ellwood and Liebman analyzed child benefits in the tax system. 
They found that, like today, many provisions benefit families with children. However, they 
uncovered an odd pattern of benefits. Those with the lowest and highest incomes received 
relatively high benefits, while middle-income families received more modest benefits. This was 
driven by the credits that assisted low-income families and the relatively high value of the 
dependent exemption for higher-income families.  
In much work that followed, scholars proposed two basic reform structures: (1) develop a 
child credit that provides benefits to all families with children while simultaneously separating 
some or all of the work incentive in the EITC, making wage subsidies available to low-income 
workers regardless of whether they supported children; and (2) simplify the definition of child 
and make that definition apply across programs. For both, how the definition is developed 
matters. For instance, attempts to limit losers or limit revenue loss often will restrict how 
universal a new law can be made. Finally, some plans propose to expand credits or make them 
more effective, which can entail either more simplification or complexity.  
The Uniform Child Credit 
In 2005, Carasso, Rohaly, and Steuerle identified two related issues in the tax system. First, as 
observed in this paper, child-related credits target highly overlapping, though not identical, 
groups. Second, families with children were becoming especially vulnerable to the alternative 
minimum tax, often as a result of the dependent exemption treating children as a tax shelter by 
the AMT. The dependent exemption was one of the largest provisions affecting the likelihood of 
paying the AMT (Carasso, Rohaly, and Steuerle 2005). Although the AMT continues to be 
patched, a more permanent solution could be implemented. 
Carasso, Rohaly, and Steuerle, therefore, proposed the creation of a uniform child credit 
(UCC). The UCC was an extension of an earlier proposal by Carasso and Steuerle that simply 
would have combined the EITC and the CTC into an earned income child credit (EICC). The 
UCC would go much further and would use or tweak current law parameters for the EITC, child 
credit, and dependent exemption, employing a common definition of child and a common 
eligibility age (Carasso, Rohaly, and Steuerle 2003). Children would be under age 19. By 
combining these benefits into one credit, all families could receive the same benefit, rather than 
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higher-income families benefiting more as a result of facing higher marginal tax rates. To save 
on costs, the credit would phase out for higher-income families, although the authors recognized 
that it would be simpler, and, on an ability to pay basis, fairer to incorporate such rate hikes 
directly in the statutory rate schedule. In many ways, this proposal represents a fix for both the 
AMT and the child provisions.  
Under the Carasso and colleagues plan, many families would no longer be at risk for the 
AMT, given that the UCC would be available to everyone and not interact with the AMT. This 
fix raises significantly the cost of such a program relative to a continually expanding AMT that 
wipes out the dependent exemption for many more taxpayers. However, Congress year after year 
prevents this expansion from taking place, so the net cost is unclear until Congress determines 
what will happen to the AMT or some ultimate replacement.  
As proposed, the UCC would provide benefits equivalent to what most families receive 
from the child tax credit, EITC, and dependent exemption if they have a child under the age of 
19. In 2005, when the analysis was performed, Carasso and colleagues projected a UCC would 
cost almost $40 billion in 2010, absent implementing some changes to the tax code to pay for all 
or part of the partial AMT and other reform. Costs of the proposal today would be on the same 
scale. In other words, change of this sort likely requires making other adjustments to an AMT or 
statutory tax rates or broader tax base issues.  
Making the ages of eligibility uniform affects both revenues and winners and losers. 
While the cost of the dependent exemption and EITC decrease, as students age 19–23 are no 
longer eligible for the benefit, the cost of the CTC increases as children age 17 and 18 become 
eligible. In this particular proposal, as noted, substantial cost is entailed by removing tens of 
millions from potential AMT liability—a direction Congress seems to be heading in piecemeal 
fashion anyway. This proposal did not deal with the issue that many 19–23-year-old children 
with low earnings and currently qualifying for the dependent exemption as a student might 
continue to be eligible for the dependent exemption as a qualifying relative.  
In recent work, Maag (2011) analyzes what would happen if only the initial step toward 
creating separate work and child credits happened—creating a uniform definition of child . She 
first notes that creating a uniform definition of child of under 19 (following the lead of the UCC) 
allows for the creation of child incentives that are both easier to understand and easier for the 
IRS to enforce. Doing this allows the opportunity to clarify incentives in the tax code and might 
pave the way for broader reform. 
President Bush’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform 
President George W. Bush convened a tax panel in 2005 to focus on making the tax system 
simpler, fairer, and more focused on economic growth (President‘s Advisory Panel 2005). The 
president directed the panel to recommend changes to the tax system that would ultimately raise 
about the same amount of money as the current system raised. As part of that, the panel 
recommended simplifications to the many child-related provisions and work provisions. They 
recommended implementing one credit focused on children and one focused on work. Because 
the proposal was part of a larger reform package, the panel produced no estimates of the cost of 
this piece of the reform. 
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The first prong of the proposal combines the personal exemption, standard deduction, 
head-of-household filing status, and the CTC into a family credit. Each taxpayer would calculate 
the family credit by adding a base amount for his or her household type (married couple, 
unmarried taxpayer with dependent children, single taxpayers, dependent taxpayers) to an extra 
amount for each child and an additional amount for each dependent (who did not meet the 
definition of child). The credit is set so the amount of income not subject to federal income tax 
under the proposal would be similar to the level of income exempt from tax under current law for 
many families. 
The second prong of the proposal, a refundable work credit for low-income families, 
consolidates the EITC and the refundable CTC into a single credit. This credit phases out for 
higher-income families, just as the EITC does under current law. The credit is set so roughly the 
same maximum credit would be available as under current law with the EITC and refundable 
CTC combined.  
Several related work credit proposals have surfaced since 2005. In the proposal released 
by its Debt Reduction Task Force at the end of 2010, the Bipartisan Policy Center created 
reforms similar to the Bush Advisory Panel that called for a worker credit and a child credit. The 
center went a step further by not tangling the worker credit up with number of children, as the 
Bush Advisory Panel chose to do. Steuerle has also suggested a way to move in this direction 
incrementally. Depending upon how much change and how much cost Congress wants to incur, 
this proposal would partially separate existing credits for work from credits for children, 
minimize losers for those already receiving the credits, proceed stepwise to limit costs, yet 
extend work credits to low-income workers without children and those who now face large 
marriage penalties by marrying or staying married to other low-income workers (Carasso et al. 
2008). Holt and Maag show that it is impossible to separate the credits without creating any 
losers or spending more money (2009). 
Refundable Credits 
Another proposal was put forth in a policy brief by Batchelder, Goldberg, and Orszag in 2006. 
This team proposed making all deductions into uniform, refundable credits. This would allow the 
same benefits to apply to lower-income and higher-income families. Families would receive a set 
credit amount, regardless of their tax bills, eliminating the need for complicated rules 
surrounding how much income a person needs to be eligible. A proposal of this sort could be 
very expensive, depending on how age thresholds and credit amounts are set. It would also 
require either the IRS to maintain contact with millions of taxpayers who do not currently file tax 
returns or welfare or other offices to maintain a backup filing capacity. 
Conclusion 
The various provisions described here show the breadth of benefits available to children and 
families with children over a wide age range. These benefits vary significantly, with some 
extending almost universally across all families on a per child basis and others designed to 
encourage work or education. They are typically justified on an ability-to-pay basis (at any 
income level, a family with children or with child care expenses is less able to pay tax than one 
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without children or without those expenses), as a subsidy for children, or as an incentive to work 
or seek more education. Regardless of the type of tax provision or its motivation, these credits 
and exemptions can add up to a sizeable amount for some families; the maximum credit a family 
of three earning $21,500 could receive is $8,740. Clearly, these tax benefits play an influential 
role in the lives of many families. 
Despite the monetary value of these awards to some families, the overlap and phaseouts 
of these different tax incentives result in a very complex system that does not always achieve 
goals commonly associated with such awards. For example, a credit provides no benefit to 
lower-income families unless it is refundable. So, when the purpose is to provide incentives, 
those individuals most likely to react are unable to do so. As a result, many child credits have 
been temporarily made refundable.  
Further, the qualifying provisions vary across benefits. While policymakers have made 
some attempts to simplify these requirements, some disparities persist. These tax provisions are 
continually changing eligibility requirements and sizes over time.  
A host of reform proposals would simplify the tax code for children through such 
methods as establishing one uniform child credit; others would expand the refundability of 
certain credits. There are positive and negative aspects of all, but simplifying a complex 
system—regardless of its costs—remains an objective for many. Simplification can help families 
better understand the implications of the credits and plan for their financial future. It would also 
make the programs easier for the IRS to administer.  
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